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INTRODUCTION

In 1991, the Correctional Corporation of America (CCA)
entered into a contract with the State of Tennessee to house and treat
state prisoners at CCA facilities.1 In response to increased costs, CCA
negotiated a contract with a physician to be the exclusive provider of
medical services for one of its facilities. 2 Essentially, this contract
formed a managed health care system: the doctor's payment structure
included a base salary, but it also incorporated financial incentives
that could increase his overall compensation if he were to provide less
3
care to inmates.
Later, Anthony Bowman, a prison inmate with sickle cell
anemia, 4 died when prison health officials failed to transfer him for
medical treatment. 5 Bowman's mother sued CCA, asserting that the
contract between the doctor and CCA violated CCA's Eighth
adequate medical care. 6
Amendment obligation to provide
Furthermore, Ms. Bowman claimed that the financial incentive
provisions of the contract motivated the doctor to delay transfer of the
7
inmate to an outside hospital-the proximate cause of his death.
The Bowman case, recently decided by the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals on jurisdictional grounds, left unanswered an important
question regarding the scope of the Eighth Amendment and
application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. The United
States Supreme Court recently readdressed the Clause's scope and the
Constitutional standard, again affirming an ambiguous duty on the
part of government. 8 Problems concerning health care in the prison
context, and the nature of this "duty" imposed upon the prison system
remain unsolved given the subsequent advent of managed health care.
How should the Court's standard apply to Bowman and future cases,
given the managed care organization that allegedly failed to properly
care for an inmate?
Part I of this Note describes the history and evolution of the
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and
its development within the context of prison health care. Part I also
briefly discusses the current state of prison health care as it relates to
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Bowman v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 188 F. Supp. 2d 870, 879 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
Id. at 879.
Id.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 882.

6.

Id. at 874.

7.
8.

Id. at 822.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-35 (1994).
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the current problem. Because courts have never applied the Eighth
Amendment to managed health care, 9 Part II analyzes the most recent
interpretations of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the
nature of its obligation on the government, and applications of the
right in circumstances analogous to managed health care. This Note
also examines Bowman v. CCA, a contemporary case implicating the
potential constitutional problem presented by managed care in
prisons.
Part III concludes that given the current case law
surrounding the Eighth Amendment, and the nature of the prison's
duty, an inmate could raise a valid constitutional claim. Finally, this
Note proposes an analysis for courts to use in such circumstances,
applicable to various forms of managed health care.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT & THE REALITY OF
PRISON HEALTH CARE

The government's responsibility to provide health care to
prisoners arises under the Eight Amendment to the Constitution,
which provides that "cruel and unusual punishment [shall not be]
inflicted." 10 Analysis of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment demands a brief review of its history and
continuing development.
Critical to understanding current
application of the right is acknowledging the fluid nature of the
Eighth Amendment, which manifests itself in an "evolving standard of
decency."11
A. HistoricalEvolution of Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment's restriction regarding punishment
stems from concerns that originated with the Code of Hammurabi, the
earliest written code of laws, and the most famous of the Old
Babylonian kings of Mesopotamia. 12 Such ancient codes incorporated
the "lex talionis," or "law of retaliation," the infamous rule

9.
With the exception of the District Court in Bowman, 188 F. Supp. 2d 870, 879 (M.D.
Tenn. 2000).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. (The Eighth Amendment mandates that "excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.").
11. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
12. Keith D. Nicholson, Would You Like More Salt With That Wound?: Post-Sentence Victim
Allocution in Texas, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1103, 1109 (1995); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 333 n.41 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (commenting that the Code of Hammurabi was
one of first legal systems to use "eye for an eye" methodology).
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proclaiming, "[e]ye for eye, tooth for tooth."'13 Western civilization
later adopted this standard in its vision of punishment that reflects
the crime. 14 Later drafted by Parliament at the accession of William
and Mary, the phrase, "cruel and unusual punishment" first appeared
in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.15 The English version of the
language appears to have been directed at unauthorized punishments
prohibited by statute and outside the jurisdiction of the sentencing
16
court, as well as those "disproportionate to the offense involved."
The American officials who drafted the Eight Amendment adopted the
English phrasing-although primarily concerning themselves with
17
forbidding " 'tortures' and other 'barbarous' methods of punishment."'
Consequently, the United States protected its prisoners from the
8
outrageous European punishments historically imposed.'
The earliest courts reviewing Eighth Amendment claims
focused on particular methods of capital punishment in determining
whether executions were too cruel to satisfy constitutional rights;
general standards relied upon "barbarous" and "tortuous" criterions. 19
Obviously, subsequent courts have not limited Eighth Amendment
application to the "barbarous" methods, most of which were outlawed
before the 19th century. 20 The United States Supreme Court, rather,
has applied the Eighth Amendment in a flexible manner,
acknowledging that for "a principle to be vital, it must be capable of
wider application than the mischief that gave it birth."2 1 In this sense,
the "cruel and unusual punishment" language has not become
obsolete, but has acquired new meaning as public opinion has become
22
more "enlightened by a humane justice."
Courts, then, have not applied the Eight Amendment in any
consistent way, as evidenced by the foregoing precedent. 23 In a
13. Exodus 21:24; see also Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Inflicted: The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 844 (1969).
14. Granucci, supra note 13, at 844.
15. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
16. Id.
17.

Id. at 170.

18. Granucci, supra note 13, at 865; see also Wesley P. Shields, Comment, PrisonerHealth
Care: Is it Proper to Charge Inmates for Health Services?, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 271, 276 (1995)
(noting prisoners in the U.S. have enjoyed greater protection than early prisoners in Europe).
19. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170.
20. Id. at 171.
21. Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171 (quoting Weems, 217
U.S. at 373).
22. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171 (quoting Weems, 217
U.S. at 373).
23. See Greggs, 428 U.S. at 171 (noting "the amendment has been interpreted in a flexible
and dynamic manner").
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frequently cited opinion24, Chief Justice Earl Warren concluded that
"[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 25
Because of this developing standard of cruel and unusual punishment,
contemporary societal values have a profound effect on the application
of the Eighth Amendment. 26 Despite the difficulty in forecasting
society's standards of decency with regard to criminal sanctions, the
United States Supreme Court has attempted to adapt the Eighth
Amendment to modern values. The Court again noted that the Eight
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment will adapt to
public sentiment as humane justice enlightens society, rather than lay
27
fixed in the past.
B. Estelle v. Gamble: DeliberateIndifference Standard
The prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment has
developed, in recent years, to impose affirmative duties on
government, including the provision of services such as medical care
to prisoners. 28 The Supreme Court has extended its definition of cruel
and unusual punishment beyond mere penalty consideration, and in
Weems v. United States, it paved the way for expansive use of the
Eighth Amendment. 29 Weems initiated judicial expansion of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause in response to public sentiment
3°
concerning harsh prison conditions.
Twentieth century development of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence continued in Trop v. Dulles, in which the Supreme
Court again broadened the Eighth Amendment's protection. 3 1 In
Trop, the Court asserted that "[t]he basic concept underlying the

24. Trop, 356 U.S. at 86.
25. Id. at 101.
26. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (noting that in assessing a sanction, the "public attitude"
towards a given sanction should be considered).
27. Carlene Gatting Carrabba, Note, Prisoners'ConstitutionalRight to Medical Treatment:
A Right Without Substance?, 7 NEW ENG. J. ON PRISON L. 341, 378 (1981) (citing Weems).
Additionally, the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the state through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
28. Marc J. Posner, The Estelle Medical Professional Judgment Standard: The Right of
Those in State Custody to Receive High Cost Medical Treatments, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 347, 348349 (noting that recent constitutional jurisprudence on the Eighth Amendment suggests states
are required to provide medical care to prisoners); Shields, supra note 18, at 36 (noting the U.S.
government has a duty, under the Eighth Amendment, to provide medical care to prisoners).
29. Carrabba, supra note 27, at 348-49.
30. Id. at 348.
31. Carrabba, supra note 27, at 349 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
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Eight Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man." 32 The
Court further contributed to the evolving cruel and unusual
punishment standard in Gregg v. Georgia, where it established a twopart test prohibiting punishments "grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime" or involving "the unnecessary and wanton
'33
infliction of pain.
The government's obligation to provide medical treatment for
prisoners did not historically arise from the Eighth Amendment;
rather, common law directed application of the duty of the custodian
with regard to government's supervision of the incarcerated separate
from any Eighth Amendment concerns. 34 The common law duty of
custodial care essentially developed from Spicer v. Williamson, which
required care for prisoners who, because of their incarceration, could
not properly attend to themselves. 35 Spicer recognized that justice
required care for prisoners, who cannot support themselves due to
deprivation of liberty. 36 Later, many state and federal statutes
incorporated this common law "duty" for the public to provide medical
37
care for prisoners.
While common and statutory law developed the concept of the
public's "duty" to provide health care, the definition of "cruel and
unusual punishment"38 simultaneously matured so as to provide
"rights" for prisoners.
In Estelle v. Gamble, a 1976 Supreme Court
decision, the majority finally combined the two concepts-right and
duty. 39 In Estelle, the Court joined the notion of "evolving standards of
decency" from Trop, the prohibition of "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain" from Gregg, and the common law duty to provide
medical treatment expressed in Spicer.40 For the first time, the Court
applied the Eight Amendment as requiring that the government

32. Id. at 354 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100).
33. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
34. Shields, supra note 18, at 278-279 (citing Indian ex rel. Tyler v. Gobin, 94 F. 48, 50
(C.C.D. Ind. 1899), in which a prisoner was kidnapped from jail by an angry mob and hanged.
The court imposed upon the sheriff a duty to provide care).
35. Id. at 279 (citing Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926), in which the
Supreme Court of North Carolina required that the public care for prisoners in the interest of
justice).
36. Spicer, 132 S.E. at 293.
37. See Shields, supra note 18, at 279 (discussing this development in the law).
38. Id. ("The development of the right to medical care for prisoners paralleled the
expanding definition of cruel and unusual punishments.").
39. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 100-03 (1976); see also Shields, supra note 18, at 279
(noting the right to medical care for prisoners and the definition of "cruel and unusual
punishment were combined in Estelle").
40. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-03.
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41
provide adequate medical care to its prisoners and detainees.
Whether the Constitution has been violated "should turn on the
character of the punishment rather than the motivation of the
individual who inflicted it."42
Estelle established the framework for health care analysis
within the prison setting. 43 In this case, a Texas prisoner alleged that
the prison violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide
The Court determined that Eight
adequate medical attention.
Amendment principles did require the government to provide medical
care to those it punishes with incarceration. 44 The Court concluded
that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by
Such conduct included indifference
the Eight Amendment." 45
demonstrated by prison doctors in their response to prisoners' needs,
or by prison guards "in intentionally denying or delaying access to
medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once
46
prescribed."
Estelle, however, acknowledged some limitation to the Eighth
Amendment in the health care context. First, the Court noted that
not every claim of inadequate medical care by a prisoner necessarily
constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 47 For example,
48
simple negligence or malpractice alone fails to show a violation.
Furthermore, Estelle provides a two-prong test for the
application of the Clause. To establish a violation under the Eighth
Amendment, Estelle requires (1) that a prisoner demonstrate a
"serious medical need," and (2) that prison officials were deliberately

41. Id. at 103.
42. Id. at 116.
43. Id. at 97; see also SUSAN L. KAY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF AN INMATE'S
RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE 3 (1991) (explaining that the state has an affirmative duty to protect
individuals in custody from private harm). The Estelle case also led to a number of circuit court
decisions validating prisoners' claims of deliberate indifference to their safety. See, e.g., Elliot v.
Cheshire County, 940 F.2d 7, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1991) (establishing duty on jail to protect detainee
from his suicidal tendencies, of which jail personnel were aware or should have been aware);
Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 459-60 (4th Cir. 1979) (establishing duty on guard to protect
prisoner from assault). For additional commentary on the state's affirmative duty to protect
individuals in custody from private harm, see Susan H. Kuo, Bringing in the State: A
ConstitutionalDuty to ProtectFrom Mob Violence, 79 IND. L.J. 177, 210 (2004).
44. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
45. Id. at 104.
46. Id. at 104-105; see also Laaman v. Helgemore, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977)
(finding that deliberate or calloused indifference to serious medical needs may be evinced by the
treating physician, prison guards, or the administration).
47. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
48. Id. at 106.
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indifferent to this need. 49 Courts refer to this standard as the medical
professional judgment standard. 50
The serious medical need
requirement is not so high as to embrace only conditions that are lifethreatening; however, a deliberate failure to treat a minor medical
need does not constitute a violation. 51 The second prong, requiring
deliberate indifference to the medical need, is similarly broad and was
left undefined by the Estelle Court; however, with developing
"contemporary standards of decency," courts have simultaneously
developed a more definitive duty of care in the prison system. 52
C. Farmer v. Brennan: A New Standard
With many questions left unanswered, the Supreme Court in
1994, again addressed the criteria for a violation of the Eighth
Amendment in Farmer v. Brennan. In Farmer, a preoperative
transsexual incarcerated with other males in the federal prison
system, claimed that another inmate beat and raped him after he was
transferred to a higher security facility holding many troublesome
prisoners. 53 The prisoner alleged that the prison had acted with
"deliberate indifference" to his safety in violation of the Eighth
Amendment because of the penitentiary's awareness of its violent
environment and history of inmate assaults, and in light of prisoners'
particular vulnerability to sexual attack. 54
The District Court
concluded that prison officials only violate the Eighth Amendment
when they are "reckless in a criminal sense."55 In other words, the
prison official would have needed" 'knowledge' of a potential danger,"
though the official in Farmer lacked such knowledge because the
prisoner never expressed his safety concerns to them. 56 The Court of
57
Appeals affirmed.

49. Id. at 104-105; see also KAY, supra note 43, at 4 n. 4 (noting that "less stringent
standards may apply under certain state constitutional provisions or (more possibly) upon
application of specific state statutes regulating medical care for prisoners").
50. Posner, supra note 28, at 353.
51. KAY, supra note 43, at 4 (citing Gibson v. McEvers, 631 F.2d 95, 98 (7th Cir. 1980); Goff
v. Bechtold, 632 F. Supp. 697, 698 (S.D. W. Va. 1986)).
52. Estelle, 428 U.S. at 103-104; see also KAY, supra note 43, at 5 (noting that "deliberate
indifference" is not overly precise as a standard-although making clear that not every action or
inaction by the government amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
53. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 825 (1994).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 831-832.
57. Id. at 825.
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The Supreme Court in Farmer required both that the prison
official know of the facts from which an inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and that the prison official
draw such an inference. 58 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
reiterated the two-prong examination for Eighth Amendment
violations. 59 The Court confirmed the first requirement-that the
alleged deprivation be "sufficiently serious" and show "substantial
The Court also accepted the second requirement-that
harm."60
prison officials act with "deliberate indifference" to inmate health or
safety. 61 The disagreement, however, concerned the proper test for
62
deliberate indifference.
The Supreme Court paused in Farmerto define at long last the
The Court acknowledged the
term "deliberate indifference."6 3
inconsistent
tests
adopted
by Courts of Appeal subsequent
confusing,
64
to Estelle v. Gamble. Justice Souter, writing for the Majority, noted
that while Estelle established that deliberate indifference entails
something more than mere negligence, clearly something less than
acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or knowledge
65
that harm will result may satisfy the standard.
The Farmer court rejected a recklessness standard. 66 The
Courts of Appeals had routinely equated deliberate indifference with
recklessness, placing deliberate indifference somewhere between the
poles of negligence at one end, and purpose or knowledge at the
other. 67
Justice Souter addressed this "recklessness" approach,
concluding that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate equals reckless

58. Id. at 837.
59. Id. at 834.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 832 (comparingMcGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 348 (7th Cir.1991) ("holding
that 'deliberate indifference' requires a 'subjective standard of recklessness' "), with Young v.
Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 360-261 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[A] prison official is deliberately indifferent when
he knows or should have known of a sufficiently serious danger to an inmate."). The Court in
Estelle distinguished "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners," from
"negligen[ce] in diagnosing or treating a medical condition." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 10405 (1976). Following Estelle, the Court described deliberate indifference as a state of mind more
"blameworthy than negligence." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Before Farmer, the Court had read
Estelle as requiring "more than an ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or
safety." Id.
65. Farmer,511 U.S. at 835.
66. Id. at 836-837.
67. Id. at 836.
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disregard for that risk. 68 However, recklessness is not itself a selfdefining standard and cannot fully answer the pending question about
69
the level of culpability deliberate indifference requires.
In its consideration of the term "deliberate indifference," the
Court ultimately favored a subjective standard as opposed to an
objective approach.70 The Court discussed the consequences of an
objective test and rejected such a standard, concluding that a prison
official cannot be found liable for cruel and unusual punishment
unless that official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk" to
inmate health or safety.7 1 Rather, the official must have awareness of
"facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." 72 In other
words, the Constitution does not outlaw cruel and unusual
"conditions;" it prohibits cruel and unusual "punishments."73
With its subjective Eighth Amendment standard, the Supreme
Court refused to impose liability on prison officials solely because of
the presence of objectively inhumane prison conditions. 74 Within the
second prong of the test, the court declined to include any objective
component-that the official should have known his act or omission
would result in injury.7 5 The Court specifically rejected a reading of
the Eighth Amendment that would have imposed liability solely
because of objectively inhumane prison conditions.7 6
Therefore,
Farmer additionally requires consciousness of risk in addition to the
objective component.7 7 The Court ultimately held that a prison official
may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment "for denying humane
conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a
substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to
take reasonable measures to abate it.78
The Supreme Court, in finally clarifying the standard for
Eighth Amendment violations in this context, also exhibited a more
contemporary standard of decency to prisoners than previously

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 837-839.
at 837.

at
at
at
at
at

838 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299-302 (1991)).
838-839.
838.
839.
847.
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demonstrated by courts. 79 The Court commented that although the
Constitution "does not mandate comfortable prisons . . . [it also does
not] permit inhumane ones."8 0 Accordingly, the Court explicitly
concluded that "the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the
conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under
the Eighth Amendment." 81 The Farmer Court remanded the case,
emphasizing that the District Court may have placed too much weight
on the prisoner's failure to notify the officials of his risk of harm, in
82
finding that the prison failed the subjective requirement.
Under the Farmer test, a claim under the Eighth Amendment
no longer requires an objective inquiry for deliberate indifference. 83 In
other words, a claimant need not show that a prison official acted or
failed to act while believing that a harm would actually befall an
inmate. 84 Rather, "it is enough that the official acted or failed to act
despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm." 85 For
example, if an inmate presented evidence that a substantial risk of
inmate injury was "longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or
expressly noted by prison officials in the past," and the record
suggested that the official had received information concerning the
risk and thus, " 'must have known' about it," then such evidence may
be "sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official
86
had actual knowledge of the risk."
D. Effect of Farmer on the Eighth Amendment: Up for Interpretation
Even after Farmer v. Brennan, the nature of the government's
duty to provide medical treatment to prisoners remains ambiguous.
Fundamental in Farmer is the principle that under the Eighth
Amendment, after the government eliminates from prisoners any
means of self-protection, the government and its officials may not
allow the state of nature simply to take its course. 87 As a result, the

79. See, e.g., id. at 833-844 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 US 86, 101 (1958) and "evolving
standards of decency").
80. Id. at 832; see also Heather M. Kinney, Note & Comment, The "DeliberateIndifference"
Test Defined: Mere Lip Service to the Protection of Prisoners' Civil Rights, 5 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 121, 124 (1995) (discussing the Farmercase).
81. Farmer,511 U.S. at 835.
82. Id. at 848.
83. Id. at 842.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 842-843.
87. Id. at 833 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 199200 (1989)).
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Eighth Amendment requires that such prison officials protect
88
prisoners from harm.
The outcome in Farmer reflects significant development in
societal and jurisprudential values, and symbolizes a shift in the
Court's perspective on prison cases; arguably this development will
persist.8 9 However, after Farmer, one can conclude that the burden
lies with prison officials as a result of their newly imposed duty to
protect prisoners and provide reasonable safety. 90
This result
significantly affects the Court's adoption of the actual knowledge
standard, considering that inaction by prison officials, when combined
with inferential evidence of actual knowledge, may constitute
deliberate indifference. 91
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion recognizes the
considerable effect Farmer has on prison officials, and the critical
bearing this reading has upon the Eighth Amendment in general.
Blackmun emphasizes that the majority opinion creates "no new
obstacles for prison inmates to overcome" and explains that "it sends a
clear message to prison officials that their affirmative duty under the
Constitution to provide for the safety of inmates is not to be taken
lightly." 92
The message of Farmer appears to be that of an

88. Marjorie Rifkin, Farmer v. Brennan: Spotlight on an Obvious Risk of Rape in a Hidden
World, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 273, 286 (1995); see also Newman v. Alabama, 522 F.2d 71
(5th Cir. 1975) (discussing application to state prisons). Although the Constitution does not
require the state to operate prisons, "as a practical matter it must." Id. at 74. However, the
Constitution does demand that if a state imprisons a citizen, "his or her imprisonment must not
transgress the interdiction of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, as
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. For a discussion on pre-trial
detainees, as opposed to prisoners, see KAY, supra note 43, at 5-6. A pre-trial detainee is a
person incarcerated in a local jail or detention facility prior to his or her trial on a criminal case.
Id. at 5. "[O]bviously, state courts may apply their own constitutions, statutes, or regulations
and provide greater protection to pre-trial detainees than the federal Constitution. In addition,
pre-trial detainees may file a simple negligence or malpractice action in state court complaining
of medical treatment that was received." Id. at 6 n.5; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)
(finding the Eighth Amendment prohibition inapplicable to pre-trial detainees because such
individuals have not been convicted, and pre-trail detainees could only raise due process claims).
89. Rifkin, supra note 88, at 286-87 (noting that the government's obligation to protect
prisoners can most likely be attributed to the perspective of a newly-configured Supreme Court
subsequent to its earlier decision in Estelle, with Justices Ginsberg, Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas).
90. Id. at 287 n.66 (noting the Supreme Court's rejection of reasoning by the Seventh
Circuit, which had held that prison officials are "entitled to assume that prisoners will exercise
care for their own safety" and, therefore, are not liable for injuries to prisoners assaulted by one
another).
91. Id. at 287.
92. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 852 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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"affirmative duty" imposed by the Eighth Amendment upon prison
officials to remedy a risk of harm. 93
Additionally, after Farmer questions linger as to the relative
weight assigned to each of the two prongs required for Eighth
Amendment liability. 94 The first prong, objective consideration of the
seriousness of the risk of harm or the harm itself, clearly will become
more important as health standards modernize. 95 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court apparently established an "affirmative duty" with
96
Farmer, but left unanswered and undefined the scope of that duty.
Do prisoners have an affirmative right to receive adequate health care
from prisons? Or, to the contrary, does this right manifest itself as
negative in nature, as a duty on the government not to show
deliberate indifference to inmate health care? 97 Given the reasoning
of Farmer and its predecessor line of cases, the courts have
98
emphasized the evolving standard of decency.
E. Prison Health Care:A ContinuingProblem
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v.
Gamble, privatization of medical services grew rapidly. 99 Managed
care-the set of practices by which insurers attempt to manage
physician practices to maintain low utilization and costs of medical
services-arose in response to skyrocketing health costs.10 0 Many
correctional departments enter contracts with private medical
providers to supply medical services throughout the system, and other
prisons contract for medical services with specific institutions. 10 1 The
prison medical unit operates in the physical setting or infirmary
established by the department of corrections yet provides medical
services independent of the department. 10 2 The medical unit recruits
and trains all medical staff, makes all medical decisions, and delivers

93. Id. at 857 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (referring to risk of harm in inmate assault,
including prison rape, in the context of the facts of Farmer).
94. Rifkin, supra note 88, at 292.
95. Id.
96. Farmer,511 U.S. at 857 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
97. Conversations with Professor James Blumstein, Vanderbilt University Law School.
98. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (stating that the "Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society").
99. CHADWICK L. SHOOK & ROBERT T. SIGLER, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN CORRECTIONAL
ADMINISTRATION 118 (2000).

100. Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians,22
AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 400-401 (1996).
101. SHOOK & SIGLER, supra note 99, at 118.

102. Id.
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all medical treatment. 10 3 In some cases, the medical unit delivers
these services within the confines of the institution; in other cases, offsite community facilities must provide more critical and intensive
10 4
medical services.
Individuals incarcerated within the correctional system are the
most challenging population in terms of a public health concern, and
the number of such inmates is rapidly increasing. 0 5 In addition to the
growing size of the prison population, inmates have raised public
health concerns given the "prevalence of mental health problems,
infectious diseases, substance abuse, and other morbidities."'' 0 6 Prison
inmates may actually require more medical attention than the general
public since they suffer from above-average incidence of most illnesses
and are prone to hypochondria and malingering. 0 7 Within secure,
incarcerated environments, inmates face distinct health risks,
disease outbreaks,
including intentional violence, infectious
10 8
ailments.
other
and
depression,
The dramatic rise in health care costs also raises concerns
about funding the expensive treatment system within prisons. 0 9 This
fiscal dilemma within the country's prison system results from a
combination of the high cost of health care, diminishing governmental
budgets, reluctant prison administrations in allocating meager funds
to medical services, and increasing taxpayer frustration with the
government's willingness to spend tax dollars on criminals. 110
Moreover, the rising cost of prison health care parallels the rapid rise
in medical costs for the overall population-and in terms of
correctional costs, health care spending increases faster than others."'
Given the discouraging state of high costs and the realities of
the prison health system, managed care provides many solutions.
Concerns regarding the quality, accessibility, and costs of prison
health care have prompted development of managed care models in
the corrections population. 1 2 Private companies claim to provide
many advantages over government-run correctional health agencies
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Harold Pollack et al., Health Care Delivery Strategies for Criminal Offenders, 26 J.
HEALTH CARE FIN. 63 (1999).

106. Id. at 65
107. Jessica Wright, Medically Necessary Organ Transplants for Prisoners: Who is
Responsible for Payment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1253-54 (1998).
108. Pollack, supra note 105, at 65.
109. Wright, supranote 107, at 1253.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Pollack, supranote 105, at 65.
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by offering, for example, reform of on-site health care operations and
reduction in the need for hospital visits.113 Private contracts allow
easier prediction of costs and provide an available pool of doctors,
nurses, and other workers who address gaps in staffing more quickly
than "government bureaucracies."' 114 Ultimately, correctional health
care companies save taxpayer money. 115
Consequently, contractual difficulties in many managed care
arrangements arise in prison health care, just as in other public sector
settings. As in other settings, "public sector organizations act as
customer, regulator, and partner in their arrangements with private
contract providers."'1 6 Therefore, public organizations frequently face
credibility
problems
when
setting
financial
incentivesreimbursement rates and contractual requirements-to protect the
long term profitability of such arrangements." 7 Among other issues
raised by the privatization of prison health care is whether the pursuit
8
of profit leads to dishonest medical practice."
Many institutional factors can contribute to market failures
within a prison health care system, which requires a greater focus on
health care adequacy.
Long-term relationships between prison
authorities and private contractors can undermine competitive
markets, a phenomenon observed in other contexts wherein a state
institution bargains with private organizations for essential
services. 1 9 The diminishing competitive pressures result in greater
latitude for contractors to earn monopoly profits, as well as lesser
incentives to address patient concerns. 20 Another potential problem
arises with "low-bidder" legislative mandates in many states, which
require that prison contracts accept only the lowest bidders.1 2 1 These
regulations arguably provide few incentives for quality, and may
113. William Allen & Kim Bell, Death, Neglect and the Bottom Line: Push to Cut Costs Poses
Risks, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 27, 1998, at G1.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Dr. Stuart Shapiro, President of Prison Health Services of New Castle, Del,
testifying before Congress, who stated, "[they] save hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars at
state and local levels."). This, of course, may be disputed. See, e.g., Todd Mason, It's a Bust:
Many For-ProfitJails Hold No Profits-NorEven Any Inmates; Still Promoters Keep Pushing
Privately Run Prisons to Job-Hungry Towns; Texas Rent-A-Cell Breakout, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, June 18, 1991.

116. Pollack, supra note 105, at 65.
117. Id.
118. Allen & Bell, supra note 113, at G1 (finding, for example, that "government agencies
have found that some companies exaggerate the amount of medical care they provide or leave
positions unfilled").
119. Pollack, supra note 105, at 4.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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produce frequent turnover given the poor profitability of
contractors. 122
Along with institutional factors, other elements of the prison
system still hinder efforts to create market discipline on contracting
providers.123 First, given the unique nature of the patient population,
the recruitment and retention of skilled medical personnel becomes
problematic.
Consequently, prison health providers experience a
higher rate of turnover and lower quality of resulting care. 124 Second,
social and political factors may contribute to less patient advocacy and
regulatory strategies that might assure quality care.1 25 The managed
care arrangement, industry and government officials say, saves the
1 26
public money and may improve health care for prisoners.
Despite the benefits of managed care within the prison context,
the managed care system presents many shortcomings that could
potentially lead to a constitutional problem. In an expose uncovering
the dangers behind Correctional Medical Services, Inc. of St. Louis,
one of the nation's largest correctional healthcare firms, the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch claimed there is reason to question the quality and
motives behind today's correctional health care.1 27 The investigation
painted a picture of an industry that, "at best, is still trying to find its
way through the complex problems posed by health care in a prison
environment."1 28 At worst emerged an industry that "takes advantage
of the public's ill will toward inmates to give poor care while making
profit."

129

122. Id.
123. Id.

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Allen & Bell, supra note 113, at G1.
127. Id. The investigative team, which included a Chicago-based specialist in correction
health care, spent more than five months visiting prisons and jails; gathered hundreds of police,
court and medical records, and other documents; and interviewed doctors, nurses, inmates,
lawyers, scholars, prison and health experts, and families of inmates who died behind bars. Id.
The team found "more than 20 cases in which inmates allegedly died as a result of negligence,
indifference, understaffing, inadequate training or overzealous cost-cutting." Id. One nurse
implicated in the death of an inmate at a Florida jail, for example, quipped, "[w]e save money
because we skip the ambulance and bring them right to the morgue .. " Id.
128. Id.

129. Id. (finding a series of troubling effects of managed health care in prisons, including
intervention of distant administrators in the practice of medicine by doctors, "often secondguessing their decisions on economic grounds," which can lead to delayed treatment or approval;
a "culture of skepticism" that permeates correctional health care; the fact that the National
Commission on Correctional Health Care, which sets standards and accredits prison and jail
health care operations, "does not serve as the watchdog that private companies claim...").
Moreover, Michael Vaughn, professor of criminology at Georgia State University claims that
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS & HOW THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT AFFECTS PHYSICIANS AND PUBLIC POLICY

A. Bowman v. CCA: A Current Case Study
An examination of Bowman v. CCA, in which an alleged
violation of the Eighth Amendment occurred in the context of a prison
health care system, illustrates the potential managed health care
problem. The plaintiff, Patricia Bowman, filed a Section 1983 action
as the next friend of her deceased son, inmate Anthony Bowman,
against CCA, the warden of its correctional facility, and Dr. Robert
Coble, a physician under contract with CCA. 130 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently ruled on the district court's finding of
potential Eighth Amendment violations-but reversing only on
jurisdictional grounds. 31
The Court failed to address the
constitutionality of managed care organizations-leaving the potential
for future litigation.
Ms. Bowman contended that the contract between CCA and
Coble, and in particular, Coble's incentive provisions within the
132
contract, motivated Coble's decision to postpone Bowman's transfer.
Further, Ms. Bowman alleged that CCA and Dr. Coble violated
Bowman's Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care for his
sickle cell anemia for failing to transfer Bowman in a timely fashion to
a hospital setting for treatment by a physician who specialized in his
particular condition.133 Finally, Ms. Bowman asserted that the failure
134
to transfer and provide adequate care resulted in her son's death.
The contract between CCA and Dr. Coble exhibited many
unique features and resembled a managed care organization. CCA
entered into a contract in 1991 with the State of Tennessee to house
state prisoners at CCA facilities, including the particular facility at
issue here, South Central Correctional Facility ("SCCF"). 135 During
its negotiation and contract formation process, CCA estimated its non"[flor every death there are hundreds of cases of inmates in these correctional facilities who are
receiving substandard care .. "
130. Bowman v. Correctional Corp. of Am., 188 F. Supp. 2d 870, 873-74 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
131. See Bowman v. Correctional Corp. of Am., 350 F.3d 537, 551 (6th Cir. 2003) (reversing
the district court's holding with respect to the unconstitutionality of CCA's medical policy, along
with the injunction awarded on that basis, since this issue was moot for Bowman and she had no
standing upon which to bring such a claim for prospective relief).
132. Bowman, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 874.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 879.

1382

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:4:1365

personnel medical expenses for the treatment of prisoners; the
expense category included "hospitalizations, referrals to medical
specialists, prescription drugs and laboratory tests."'136 Although
CCA's initial expense projection was $500,000 per year, during 1992,
1993, and 1994, its actual expenses for these services and products
exceeded $1,000,000.137
In response to the unexpected, increased costs, CCA in 1994
negotiated with Dr. Coble to exclusively provide health services at
SCCF. 138 Effectively, the contract formed a managed health care
system at SCCF.139 Dr. Coble's duties consisted of, among other
responsibilities, "determining the existence of medical emergencies.' ' 4
Additionally, the contract configured Dr. Coble's compensation so he
would receive a base salary, but included financial incentives that
could increase his compensation by $95,000 per year. 14 1 At the time of
the contract's execution, CCA's medical cost rate per inmate was $3.07
per day.142 However, evidence showed that medical expenses under
143
Dr. Coble decreased to $1.46 per inmate.
The plaintiff asserted two theories to establish the "deliberate
indifference" necessary to trigger municipal liability. Her first theory
argued that the contract between CCA and Coble, with its extreme
financial incentives to reduce necessary medical services for inmates,
represented
an unconstitutional
policy that violated CCA's
constitutional obligation to provide adequate medical care under the
Eighth Amendment.1 44 The plaintiff's second theory further argued
that the effect of the financial incentive provisions of the contract
between CCA and Coble motivated the physician to delay a transfer of
Bowman to an outside hospital and that the untimely transfer
proximately caused his death. 14 The district court reserved the first,
constitutional issue to decide for itself, while the jury decided the
146
second issue of causation and damages.
The district court relied heavily upon the language of Estelle v.
Gamble, without reference to the subsequent decision of Farmer v.

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

140. Id.

141. Id.
142. Id. at 880.
143. Id.

144. Id. at 882.
145. Id.

146. Id.
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Brennan.147 The district court noted that "[r]egardless of how
evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or
injury states a cause of action. .. "148 The court also quoted Estelle,
suggesting that ordinary medical treatment questioned by prisoners is
not necessarily enough for a constitutional violation and that the
action must be characterized as "repugnant to the conscience of
mankind."'149 Similarly, the court referred to the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, which stated that where prisoners have received
some medical attention and the dispute centers on the adequacy of the
treatment, federal courts are reluctant to second-guess medical
judgments and to "constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort
150
law."
However, despite the court's acknowledgement of the
heightened bar for constitutional actions of prison health care, it noted
that, "medical attention rendered may be so woefully inadequate as to
amount to no treatment at all."' 5' When the government incarcerates
an individual and holds the prisoner against his will, the Constitution
imposes a corresponding duty to assume responsibility for his safety
and well being. 52 When the State exercises its power to restrain a
person's liberty, but fails to provide for basic human needs, it
transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth
53
Amendment.1
This decision reinforced the notion that CCA cannot contract
away its legal obligations to provide adequate medical care to inmates
in its custody.' 54 Federal courts prohibit prison and jail officials from
outsourcing or contracting away their constitutional duty to provide
and monitor the medical treatment provided to prisoners. 55 For
example, in a situation involving a sheriff, whose policy constitutes
deliberate indifference to the needs of inmates, the county is liable as
a result-given the official capacity of the sheriff.156 Similarly, CCA

147. Id. at 883. This is interesting because the Supreme Court addressed the Eighth
Amendment standard for health care in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). Courts still
regard Estelle as the true standard. See id. at 835 (discussing "deliberate indifference" and the
Estelle case); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1993) (same).
148. Bowman, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 883.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
151. Id.

152. Id. at 884.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Willis v. Barksdale, 625 F. Supp. 411 (W.D. Tenn. 1985), in discussing
vicarious liability).
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must provide medical care for state inmates by virtue of its contract
with the Tennessee Department of Corrections; CCA's agreement with
57
Dr. Coble cannot contract away this responsibility.1
The court addressed the plaintiffs claim according to the dual
(objective and subjective) components of an Eighth Amendment
claim. 158 Courts focus on the likelihood of exposure to harm, not
manifest symptoms of disease, in determining the objective
requirement for Eighth Amendment claims of this nature. 15 9 In
Helling, the Supreme Court observed "that the Eighth Amendment
160
protects against future harm to inmates is not a novel proposition."'
Under Helling, the prisoner must show current harm or that the
medical policy "is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and
needless suffering." 16 1 Despite the objective element of an Eighth
Amendment claim, which requires a "serious medical" condition, the
Bowman district court emphasized that actual physical injury due to
indifference is unnecessary. 162
The district court first found that CCA's contract violated the
objective requirement. The contract between CCA and Dr. Coble
governed not only the referrals of inmates to medical specialists, but
the decisions to issue prescription drugs and to conduct medical
laboratory tests.' 63 The district court stated that, by definition, the
medical services provided by CCA involved a perceived or actual
serious medical condition requiring medical treatment or analysis by a
medical specialist.164
Therefore, the court concluded that the
decedent's claim as to the constitutionality of CCA's health
management contract on non-personnel medical services satisfied the
165
objective component of the Eighth Amendment claim.
The Bowman district court then emphasized the broadness of
the subjective requirement for Eighth Amendment violations. The
court noted that establishment of deliberate indifference requires no
proof of intent to harm or a detailed inquiry into a party's state of
mind as to the indifference. 1 66 Furthermore, the standard requires no
conscious indifference, rather just "knowledge of the asserted serious

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 885 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 886 (citing Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185, 187 (6th Cir. 1993)).
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needs or of circumstances clearly indicating the existence of such
needs.. .,167 The court also acknowledged that delays in providing
access to medical care or recommended surgery for inmates can
demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious medical problem. 168
The Bowman court also analyzed constitutional policies on
medical care, as opposed to decisions involving individual treatment
cases. 16 9 In Ancata, the Eleventh Circuit considered a county's policy
requiring inmates to obtain a court order before referring them to a
nonstaff medical specialist, unless the prisoners paid the bill
themselves. 170 The Eleventh Circuit determined that the county's
policy could constitute deliberate indifference.1 71
Perhaps most
applicable to the context of managed health care, Ancata concluded
that "if necessary medical treatment has been delayed for non-medical
reasons, a case of deliberate indifference has been made out,"
including where defendants place "financial interests.. .ahead of the
serious needs [of a prisoner]."172
The Bowman district court found itself bound to the jury's
determination of the cause and effect of CCA's policy upon the
deceased inmate Bowman given both the complexity of the issues
surrounding his medical condition, his personal medical history, and
the necessity of allowing the exercise of medical judgment.1 7 3 The
jury, however, found no causal connection between Dr. Coble's
treatment, the CCA policy, and Bowman's death.1 74 Nonetheless, the
Court noted its separate obligation for injunctive relief to determine if
the medical policy would likely expose inmates to harm, and therefore
violate "contemporary standards of decency."' 175 So despite the jury
finding a lack of causation-the court noted the possibility of a
constitutional violation.
In assessing whether CCA's policy violated contemporary
standards, the district court expressed concerns regarding the

167. Id. (quoting Horn v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 103, 110 (6th Cir. 1994)).
168. Id. (citing Byrd v. Wilson, 701 F.2d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 1983) (describing a nine hour
delay of medical treatment after clear notice of medical need); Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072,
1076 (6th Cir. 1972) (also noting a nine hour delay after clear notice of medical need); Bunton v.
Englemyre, 557 F. Supp. 1, 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (holding a four day delay in treating medical
needs satisfied denial of summary judgment).
169. Id. (citing Ancata v. Prison Health Services Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 702 (1985)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 886-87.
172. Id. at 887.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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financial motivations of CCA policymakers. 176 CCA's medical director
primarily concerned himself with financial costs and exercised little
meaningful supervision over Dr. -Coble's substantive medical
decisions. 177 The court again noted that Dr. Coble had substantial
financial incentives to limit medical care. 178 "As employees of a
private corporation seeking to maximize profits, correctional officers
act, at least in part, out of a desire to maintain the profitability of a
corporation for whom they labor, thereby insuring their own job
security." 179 The court elucidated that, with respect to cutting corners
on constitutional guarantees, "entrepreneurial jailers benefit directly,
1 80
in the form of increased profits, from every dime not spent."
When determining whether the health management policy
violates contemporary standards, courts must rely upon objective
external factors in making its conclusions. 81 The Council on Ethics
and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association ("AMA")
published a report that established ethical standards and
considerations on financial incentive provisions in physician contracts
in a managed health care program. 182 This report suggested limits on
the magnitude of financial incentives, proposing incentives calculated
according to practices of a sizable group of physicians rather than on
an individual basis, and based on quality of care instead of cost of
care. 183

Applying the professional medical standards deemed
appropriate by the AMA, the court recognized that financial incentives
within Dr. Coble's plan exceeded the acceptable risk threshold of 25
percent.1 84 CCA's contract with Dr. Coble effectively permitted him to
double his income under the contract. 185 Also contrary to AMA
standards, these financial incentives were based on the performance of
1 86
one physician rather than a group or groups of physicians.
Furthermore, the court noted that the monthly payments to Dr. Coble
heightened the impact of financial incentives upon the physician's
compensation, as the AMA report predicted.187
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

185. Id.

186. Id.
187. Id.

(quoting McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 1996)).
(citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1981)).
at 887-888.
at 889.
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Given the collective medical, legal, and correctional standards
applicable, the district court concluded that CCA's medical policy, as
represented by its contract with Dr. Coble, violated contemporary
standards of decency.1 88 The managed care plan violated the standard
of decency by giving a physician who provides exclusive health
treatment to prison inmates financial incentives to substantially
increase his income through reductions in medical services necessary
to inmates. 8 9 CCA's contract with Dr. Coble reduced medical costs
Similarly, CCA's
from $2.43 per inmate to $1.48 per inmate.1 90
prescription drug costs diminished from $108,751 in 1994 to $74,660
in 1997, despite an increase of 170 inmates and soaring market prices
1 91
of prescription drugs.
After years of litigation, the case resulted in a jury verdict in
favor of the defendants CCA and Coble-except as to the claim that
CCA's medical policy violated the Eighth Amendment. 92 The district
court concluded that, as a matter of law, CCA's policy violated its
Eighth Amendment duty to provide adequate medical care to its
inmates. 193 The court held that "CCA's medical policy with its
exclusive contract for Dr. Coble's services and its extreme financial
incentives for Coble poses a significant risk for the denial of necessary
medical treatment for inmates ... in violation of the Eighth
94
Amendment."1
The district court in Bowman primarily concerned itself with
the fact that Dr. Coble, with his incentives, exclusively administered
referrals to medical specialists or determined the need for
prescriptions and laboratory tests. 195 The court was also concerned
that inmates had no other choice of health care provider, asserting
that the "Eighth Amendment forbids unnecessary suffering in the
short term for inmates who are wholly dependant upon the state to
provide such basic medical care."' 96 After an economic analysis, the
Court noted that for each year of his contract, Dr. Coble reached the
maximum of his financial incentives. 97 Essentially, the contract

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 890.
at
at
at
at
at
at

889.
889-890.
874.
891.
874.
890.
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created "serious potential conflicts" between the health needs of the
prisoners and the personal financial interests of a physician. 198
The district court cautioned that its conclusion should not be
construed as categorically barring from prison settings managed
health care systems with physician incentives. 199 The court made no
attempt to set compensation rates for medical services, suggesting
that how institutional policy impacts particular inmates depends upon
"individual determination."' 20 0 Ultimately the court found that this
contract simply went "too far," as reflected by the record. 20 1 Despite
the arguably unique set of facts in Bowman, the court suggested that
a managed health care system within a prison setting can violate the
20 2
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
B. Nature of the Government's Eighth Amendment Duty: Affirmative or
Negative?
Even after the Supreme Court's decision in Farmer v. Brennan,
the nature of the government's duty under the Eighth Amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment remains unclear. The
Supreme Court has addressed the notion of governmental duty
provided by the Constitution, and has not generally conferred an
affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be
necessary to secure life, liberty or property interests. 20 3 But where the
government has deprived an individual of liberty, as in the prison
setting, the Constitution imposes upon the states affirmative duties of
care and protection. 20 4 Analysis of a line of cases documenting
interpretation of the government's constitutional duty regarding
prison libraries presents a reasonable parallel to health care for
inmates. The Supreme Court in 1977, with Bounds v. Smith, held
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.

202. Id.
203. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will,
the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility
for his safety and general well being... The rationale for this is simple enough: when
the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty
that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for
his basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable
safety-it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 199-200.
204. Id. at 198 (noting the Eighth Amendment as one example of an "affirmative [duty]"
upon the states to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated prisoners).

HMOs BEHIND BARS

2005]

1389

that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts
requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and
filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisons with adequate
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the
law." 205 The question arose later, in Lewis v. Casey, as to the nature of
20 6
this duty.
Lewis presents the question of constitutional requirements in
the context of access to the courts, and assesses challenges to the
district court, which had rejected claims of "systemic injury" and found
no Bounds violations. 20 7 In Lewis, twenty-two inmates of various
prisons filed a class action on behalf of adult prisoners incarcerated by
the State of Arizona, alleging deprivation of their rights of access to
the courts and counsel protected by the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. 20 8 The Arizona Department of Corrections argued that
in order to establish a Bounds violation, an inmate must show that the
inadequacies of a prison's library facilities or legal assistance program
caused him actual injury. 20 9 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
found that the district court's failure to identify anything more than
isolated instances of actual injury rendered the Bounds violation
2 10
invalid.
Scalia in Lewis analyzed standing in the prison context and
drew analogy to Estelle v. Gamble.2 1 1 If a healthy inmate, who had
suffered no deprivation of necessary medical treatment, could claim
violation of his constitutional right to medical care simply on the
ground of inadequate prison medical facilities, "the essential
distinction between judge and executive would have disappeared. .. it
would have become the function of the courts to assure adequate
medical care in prisons." 2 12 Justice Scalia acknowledged that Bounds
established no right to a law library or to legal assistance any more
than Estelle established a right to a prison hospital. 213 Bounds, to
Justice Scalia, acknowledged the "already well-established" right of
access to the courts. 2 14 Similarly, Scalia implied that the Estelle case
was limited to establishing protection from cruel and unusual

205. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
206. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
207. Id. at 348.

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

214. Id.

at 346.
at 348.
at 349.
at 350.
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punishment. 215 In discussing the right of access to the courts, Scalia
suggested that there is no affirmative right to health care, rather a
216
negative duty to protect from cruel and unusual punishment.
Comparable to the effect of Estelle, Bounds emphasized that law
library facilities were merely "one constitutionally acceptable method
to assure meaningful access to the courts" and that its decision "[did]
217
not foreclose alternative means to achieve that goal."
Justice Scalia's discussion of the implications of Bounds relates
to what right essentially arises with regards to prison access. 218
Therefore, an inmate cannot establish relevant injury simply by
establishing that one's prison law library or legal assistance program
is inadequate in some theoretical sense. 21 9 Scalia refers to this
concept as the "precise analog" of the healthy inmate claiming
220
constitutional violation due to inadequacy of a prison infirmary.
Thus, as a "precise analog" of the prison library cases, an inmate does
not have an affirmative or "free-standing" right to medical care,
according to Justice Scalia's dicta.
The line of prison library cases illustrates the nature of
constitutional rights granted to prisoners, and the Supreme Court
suggested a "precise analog" to such rights under the Eighth
Amendment. 221 Ultimately, the Court deemed meaningful access to
the courts as the "touchstone" requiring the inmate to "go one step
further" and establish that the alleged shortcomings in the prison's
library or legal assistance program hindered efforts to pursue a legal
claim. 222 Although prisoners have no affirmative right, that is, cruel
and unusual punishment remains the "touchstone," (as an "analog" to
Bounds), inadequate access to medical care might very well violate the
Eight Amendment. Thus, prison managed care itself does not violate
the Eighth Amendment, but if its implementation results in some
injury due to skewed financial incentives, prison managed care might
satisfy the constitutional pre-requisite of injury for a valid claim.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id.
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 830 (1977).
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. The Negative Right: When Does the Government Fulfill Its Duty?
The Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, as noted in
Lewis v. Casey, provides a negative right, or duty on behalf of the
government, rather than an affirmative right to health care by
prisoners. 223 The question now arises as to the level of medical care
required in order for the government to fulfill this negative duty. It is,
of course, well-established that deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment, though
exactly what "deliberate indifference" means remains unclear. 224
Despite the Supreme Court's discussion of the "deliberate indifference"
standard in Farmer v. Brennan, the U.S. Courts of Appeals still vary
on interpreting the level of conduct that sufficiently states a claim for
2 25
cruel and unusual punishment.
In general, prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment by
satisfying two requirements. First, under the objective prong, the
deprivation must be sufficiently serious. 226 Second, the subjective
prong
determines
whether
defendants
exhibit
"deliberate
indifference." 227 Again, the Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan
recently expounded on the phrase and adopted "subjective
recklessness" as the test for "deliberate indifference," consistent with
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 228 At the same time, the
Court rejected an objective component for the test (that prison officials
"should have" known). 229 The Court finally concluded that a prison
official under the Eighth Amendment may be held liable "for denying
humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face
a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing
to take reasonable measures to abate it."230 So long as the medical
need to which the corrections officials were deliberately indifferent is
"serious," the claim satisfies the requirement. 23 1 Still, the general test
223. Id. at 350; Conversations with Professor James Blumstein, Vanderbilt University Law
School.
224. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
225. Stacy Lancaster Cozad, Cruel But Not So Unusual: Farmer v. Brennan and the
Devolving Standards of Decency, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 175, 201-204 (1995) (concluding that Farmer
leaves ambiguity whereas some courts have taken a standard from Farmer that still allows
prisoners to establish actual knowledge merely by pointing to the obviousness of the risk, despite
Farmer's clear rejection of a subjective component that the officer or prison official should have
known of some risk).
226. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
227. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
228. Id. at 839-840.
229. Id. at 839-840.
230. Id. at 847.
231. Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1996).
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for Eighth Amendment violations remains broad, leaving the potential
for a court to find managed care violative.
Mere disagreement with the medical treatment received does
not provide standing for an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate
indifference to medical needs. 23 2 Effectively, the Eighth Amendment
is distinct from a medical malpractice cause of action. 233 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that deliberate indifference only
encompasses "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant to
the conscience of mankind."234 Again, subjective recklessness as used
235
in criminal law is the appropriate test for deliberate indifference.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals similarly concluded that the
Constitution is not a "medical code that mandates specific medical
236
treatment."
However, deliberate indifference to "serious medical needs"
meets the requirement for Eighth Amendment violations. A serious
medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.2 3 7 Moreover,
even elective treatment recommended by a physician but not
"necessary" to saving life or health, may be constitutionally mandated
238
upon a prisoner's election of that treatment.
Additionally, a lack of knowledge by the prison official of any
harm most likely precludes any Eighth Amendment violation. 239 As a
result of Farmer having eliminated any objective component in the
deliberate indifference analysis, if a doctor has no knowledge of any
harm to the prisoner, most courts will find no violation. For example,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found no violation where prison
doctors failed to discover a tumor that resulted in an inmate's
blindness. The court rejected the claim, concluding that unless he
proves that the doctor both knew about the condition and ignored it,
240
the prisoner cannot satisfy the deliberate indifference standard.
232. Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997).
233. See, e.g., Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting "the courts have
labored mightily to prevent the transformation of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual
punishments clause into a medical malpractice statute for prisoners"); see also Forbes v. Edgar,
112 F.3d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting medical malpractice does not ordinarily give rise to an
Eighth Amendment claim).
234. Norton, 122 F.3d at 291.
235. Id.
236. Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir.1996).
237. Laaman v. Helgemore, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977).
238. Id.
239. Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 169-70 (4th Cir. 1998).
240. Id.
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This standard clearly requires more than mere negligence, although
inmates need not establish that a prison official, through inaction or
24 1
omission, undertook specifically to harm the inmate.
Another
fundamental
aspect
of Eighth
Amendment
interpretation by the courts is the evolving "contemporary standards
of decency" standard. Even after Farmer v. Brennan, the Second
Circuit, for example, acknowledged this evolving standard in reversing
a denial of a prisoner's claim under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. 242
In Koehl, an inmate alleged that his
prescription eyeglasses were necessary to prevent him from
experiencing double vision and flawed depth perception. 243 The
Second Circuit determined that, while these conditions do not cause
suffering, they were sufficiently inconsistent with "contemporary
standards of decency." 244 Though these consequences of merely
denying the inmate a pair of glasses do not inevitably entail pain, the
Court found that they adequately met the test of "suffering" from
245
Estelle v. Gamble.
Although courts have never found the financial incentives of
managed health care to violate the Eighth Amendment, the features of
such a system could potentially fail the constitutional responsibilities
imposed on the government.
As the contemporary standards of
decency have evolved, so too have our notions of physical harm and
medical deprivation. As a result of Estelle's philosophy, courts will
recognize a constitutional claim when prison officials intentionally
246
deny access to medical care or interfere with prescribed treatment.
While single instances of health treatment denied or delayed may
appear to be the product of mere negligence when viewed in isolation,
"repeated examples of such treatment bespeak a deliberate
indifference by prison authorities to the agony engendered by
247
haphazard and ill-conceived procedures."
A series of incidents closely related in time "may disclose a
pattern of conduct amounting to deliberate indifference to true
241. See SHOOK & SIGLER, supra 99, at 119 (stating that an inmate must show that an
institutional official was more than merely negligent in response to a medical condition and
noting that "[i]nmates do not need to show that the inaction on the part of the officials was
undertaken to specifically harm the inmate.").
242. Koehl v. Dalsheim, 83 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing the "contemporary standards of
decency" standard).
243. Id. at 87.
244. Id. at 88.

245. Id. at 88 (finding the denial of eyeglasses satisfied the "suffering" test laid out in
Gamble).
246. Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977).
247. Id.
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medical needs of prisoners. '248 In Todaro v. Ward, the Second Circuit
found that the existing prison procedures had resulted in interminable
delays and outright denials of medical care to suffering inmates. 249
The Second Circuit refused to accept the argument that institutional
practices must be defective to the maximum degree before a
constitutional rights violation can be recognized and corrected. 250
Rather, the court emphasized that to hold as such would encourage
lowering prison health standards to the "lowest common
denominator."' 2 51 The Second Circuit concluded that inadequate
resources no longer can excuse the denial of constitutional rights. 252
Moreover, courts may likely consider delay of emergency medical
treatment to be deliberately indifferent in the context of the Eighth
253
Amendment.
Similarly, when "systematic deficiencies" in staffing, facilities,
or procedures inevitably result in unnecessary suffering, courts will
not hesitate to use injunctive powers. 254 The Constitution "does not
stand in the way of a broader attack on the adequacy of an
institution's entire health care system which threatens the well-being
of many individuals." 255 The measure by which a prison's medical care
services and the system of access to them are to be judged is whether
or not the facilities, acts, or omissions endanger the health of the
prison community in a deliberate or calloused manner. 256

248. Id. (quoting Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974).
249. Id. at 53
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 54 n.8 (citation omitted).
253. See Archer v. Dutcher, 733 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that where prison personnel
waited five hours before sending a prisoner suffering from abdominal pain to proper treatment at
a nearby hospital, the actions may have constituted deliberate indifference).
254. Todaro, 565 F.2d at 52.
255. Id.
256. Laaman v. Helgemore, 437 F. Supp. 269, 315 (D.N.H. 1977) (finding that "the medical
unit must be looked at as a whole because it is the end result, the total health care made
available to and received by the plaintiff class which is subject to constitutional scrutiny .... ).
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IV. APPLICATION: COULD THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT APPLY TO
MANAGED HEALTH CARE?

A. What Must a PrisonerEstablish to Present a Valid Claim?
In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Estelle and Farmer,
a prisoner could very well present a valid Section 1983 claim against a
prison or prison official under the appropriate circumstances. 257 Given
the progeny of Estelle and despite the emphasis on subjective intent in
Farmer, the claim need not establish malicious intent. 25 8 However,
the prisoner must show an abundance of causation to satisfy the first
259
prong and something more than negligence for the second element.
Bowman v. CCA arguably demonstrates a scenario in which a
managed care organization's conduct could satisfy the first prong of
this test. Assuming the prisoner in such a situation, one with sickle
cell anemia for instance, can show a sufficiently serious deprivation of
medical care, the focus turns to the test's subjective prong. Therefore,
the probable battleground in many cases regarding the ultimate
question of whether a managed health care plan has violated the
Eighth Amendment will turn on the "deliberate indifference" question.
Although the Supreme Court decided Wilson v. Seiter prior to
Farmer, Wilson mandated an inquiry into the prison official's state of
260
mind when considering a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.
The Wilson Court specifically rejected a proposal that draws a
distinction between "short-term" or "one-time" conditions (in which a
state of mind requirement would apply) and "continuing" or
"systematic" conditions (in which state of mind would be irrelevant). 26 1
This relates to the issue of managed care, since a plaintiff could argue
that the systematic flaws of managed health care lead to continuous
and inevitable injury among the prisoners. The fact that the Court
refused to establish such a standard suggests that a prison's health
257. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 US 189, 196, 200-201
(1989) (acknowledging that when a state incarcerates a person, the Constitution imposes a
"corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and well-being"). However, the
Court found the Estelle analysis simply did not apply to the facts of this case. Id.
258. Wilson v. Seiter, 510 U.S 294, 305 (1991).
259. Id. at 305-06 (noting mere negligence would not satisfy whether the respondent acted
"maliciously" nor would it satisfy the "deliberate indifference" standard); Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (distinguishing "'deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners,' from 0 'negligen[ce] in diagnosing or treating a medical condition,' holding that only
the former violates the Clause").
260. Wilson, 510 U.S. at 299.
261. See id. at 300 (finding "neither a logical nor a practical basis" for drawing such a
distinction).
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policy, which systematically treated inmates poorly, would not
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation without subjective intent.
However, the Court has also rejected the argument that the
Eighth Amendment does not protect against prison conditions that
merely threaten to cause health problems in the future-that is, the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause does protect against future
harm. 26 2 That a prison authority may not be deliberately indifferent
to an inmate's current health problems but could ignore a condition of
imprisonment that is certain or very likely to cause serious illness and
needless suffering "the next week or month or year. . ." ignores the
essence of the Eighth Amendment. 263 For example, "a prisoner could
successfully complain about demonstrably unsafe drinking without
264
waiting for an attack of dysentery."
In Helling v. McKinney, the Court remanded an inmate's claim
that prison officials were deliberately indifferent in exposing him to
levels of ETS that posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his
future health. 265 The inmate had been assigned a cell with another
inmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day. 266 Although there
is no constitutional right to a smoke-free prison environment, the
Court recognized this as a valid cause of action under the Eighth
Amendment by alleging that he had been involuntarily exposed to
levels of ETS. 267 The Court noted scientific opinion that exposure to
ETS could pose unreasonable risk of harm, and also concluded that
society's attitude had evolved to the point that involuntary exposure to
unreasonably dangerous levels of ETS violated "current standards of
decency." 268 The Court rejected the argument that only deliberate
indifference to current serious health problems of inmates is
actionable under the Eighth Amendment. 269 The Court reserved for
the district court the issues of whether exposure to ETS is sufficiently

262. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1993).
263. Id. at 33 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978), in which the Court noted
that inmates in punitive isolation were crowded into cells and that some of them had infectious
maladies such as hepatitis and venereal disease-and this condition required a remedy-even
though it was not alleged that the harm would occur immediately and may not affect all of those
exposed).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 35. Exposure to environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS") is often associated with
chronic disease in nonsmokers.
266. Id. at 28.
267. Id. at 29.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 34.
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grave to implicate "serious medical need" and whether such exposure
270
is contrary to current standards of decency.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court emphasizes the concept of
"punishment" in construing them from within the Eighth
Amendment. 27' The source of the intent requirement is "the Eighth
Amendment itself, which bars only cruel and unusual punishmentrather than the predilections of the Court." 272 The Court also has
indicated that holding convicted criminals in unsafe conditions
273
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Despite the somewhat heightened subjective standard imposed
on the prisoner's claim, Wilson urged further analysis by the lower
court even when the challenged conduct appears to be just
negligence. 274 Wilson concluded that, out of an abundance of caution,
the lower court conceivably could have given further thought to "at
best.. .negligence," despite a standard that prison officials acted
"maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." 275
Of course mere negligence would not satisfy an Eighth Amendment
standard of deliberate indifference, but the Court's remand of this case
demonstrates that a plaintiff might show a valid Section 1983 claim
276
challenging inhumane prison conditions.
B. At What Point Does a Policy or Doctor Impute Liability Upon the
Prison?
Had the Bowman jury concluded that the doctor did in fact act
with deliberate indifference to Mr. Bowman, another question would
have arisen as to the point at which the policy of a managed care
organization would show injury. The Court has never addressed this
270. Id. at 35.
271. Wilson v. Seiter, 510 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (emphasizing that the Eighth Amendment
only bans punishment); see also Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting
that a prison guard accidentally injuring a prisoner would not be considered punishment);
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) ("The thread common to all [Eighth
Amendment prison cases] is that 'punishment' has been deliberately administered for a penal or
disciplinary purpose ... ").
272. Wilson, 510 U.S. at 300 (emphasis in original); see also Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 652:
The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter. This is
what the word means today; it is what it meant in the 18th century ....
[1]f [a] guard
accidentally stepped on [a] prisoner's toe and broke it, this would not be punishment.
. whether we consult the usage of 1791, 1868 or 1985.
273. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-316 (1982).
274. Wilson, 510 U.S. at 305.
275. Id. at 305-306 (The lower court applied a standard whereby the prison official must
have acted "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.").
276. See Wilson, 510 U.S. at 311 (White, J. concurring) (noting, however, that the majority's
holding makes it easier for prison officials to defeat a Section 1983 claim brought by a prisoner).

1398

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:4:1365

issue in the prison context, but has done so with claims of excessive
force, false arrest, and false imprisonment incidents by law
enforcement officials. 277 For example, a municipality may not be held
278
liable under Section 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor.
Rather, the plaintiff must identify a municipal "policy" or "custom"
279
that caused the injury.
The Supreme Court does not authorize the award of damages
against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its
officers when the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no
constitutional harm. 28 0 If a person has suffered no constitutional
injury at the hands of the individual officer or prison official, policies
or regulations that may have authorized a particular act or procedure
2s
is "quite beside the point." i
The Court has also consistently refused to hold municipalities
liable under a theory of respondeat superior. 28 2 A city is not liable
under Section 1983 unless a municipal policy causes a constitutional
deprivation as determined using a two-factor test. First, there is the
issue of whether the policy in question is adequate. 28 3 Second, if the
policy is not adequate, the next question becomes whether such
28 4
inadequate policy can be said to justifiably represent "city policy."
As the Court noted, it may appear "contrary to common sense" to
assert that a municipality would actually have such an unreasonable
policy-and this holds true for the prison context.
Why would a prison implement a health care policy of
inadequate treatment? 28 5 The Court responded that the policymakers
277. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (excessive use of force
by a police officer).
278. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).
279. Brown, 520 U.S. at 403.
280. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
281. Id. (finding that Police Department regulations authorizing use of force cannot be found
unconstitutional when the police officer's treatment of the plaintiff was itself not
unconstitutional).
282. Brown, 520 U.S. at 403; see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818
(1985) (noting that the Court had previously held that a city could not be held liable under
Section 1983 based upon theories akin to respondeat superior); City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under Section
1983).
283. Harris, 489 U.S. at 390-91 (discussing a municipal policy for training police officers).
The Supreme Court has never decided the issue of imputed liability in the prison context.
Nonetheless, this represents a valid parallel in that courts could analyze the liability of prison
systems under a test that considers the adequacy and justifiability of their policies.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 390 Again, the Court analyzes this institutional policy in the context of police
officer training-but the parallel can be effectively established here to prison policy. Why would
a prison ever institute a policy that is facially deficient?
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of the city can "reasonably said to have been deliberately indifferent to
[a] need" where both the need for a proper policy is obvious and the
inadequacy is likely to result in the violation of constitutional
rights. 28 6 In this event, the failure to provide proper health treatment
may be fairly said to represent a policy for which the city is
responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if it actually
causes the injury. 28 7 Additionally, in order for liability to attach in
this context, the policy must be closely related to the ultimate
injury. 288 While a prison could not be held liable under respondeat
superior, liability resulting from a prison's managed health policy
could be imputed to the State under a Section 1983 claim.
C. Managed Health Care and its Reputation
Since the Supreme Court has established the avenue potential
prisoner claims must take against a managed health care policy under
the Eighth Amendment, the question becomes: should courts hold
some managed health care systems deliberately indifferent? Certainly
managed health care and HMOs have a questionable reputation
among much of the public, and the advent of the Patient's Bill of
Rights has instigated considerable backlash against managed care. 28 9
A large and growing number of physicians in today's managed care
market receive pay for services according to incentives that offer
financial rewards for providing less and less expensive medical
treatment. 290 These schemes typically reward doctors for decreasing
costs of care, reducing the number and costs of referrals for inpatient
or specialty care. 291
In response, many states are currently
considering bills to limit or prohibit physician incentive plans, as
292
identified in Bowman.
The primary claims a prisoner would raise regarding managed
health policies would center on physician incentive plans. 293 Basic
physician payment customarily occurs through three modes: fee for
service (historically the dominant form of pay-until managed care),
salary, or capitation. 294 Plans with fee for service still reward

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 391.
Conversations with Professor James Blumstein, Vanderbilt Law School.
LATHAM, supra note 100, at 399.
Id.
Id.
For an in depth analysis of financial incentives within managed care, see id.
Id. at 402
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physicians for providing fewer services, in that they still seek to limit
unnecessary care, thereby controlling costs. 295 Plans with salaries
also adopt incentive schemes to keep physicians conscious of cost
control. 296 Finally, capitation systems-as discussed in Bowman,
297
similarly create incentives to control and reduce costs.
Capitation systems spark the most debate regarding financial
incentives. First, physicians and other providers claim that capitation
has introduced economic considerations into their provision of care
and that they occasionally "are aware that they can save money by
withholding care or providing less expensive care (for example,
substituting a generic drug for a name-brand pharmaceutical), and
this creates an inherent conflict of interest."298 Second, many experts
also assert that low payments do not provide enough money to fund
the preventive care services that capitation theoretically should
encourage; furthermore, many health plans offer bonuses to
physicians
for
efficiency-"either
for
following
'utilization
299
management' guidelines... or through some other mechanism."
However, despite the widespread use of incentive payments in
managed health care, there exists little data determining the effects of
incentive schemes. 300 Although we know that managed care greatly
reduces the costs of treatment, there is relatively little information
indicating that these limitations "result in increased morbidity or
mortality among managed care patients, as opposed to [fee for service]
301
patients."
Given the arguably worthy aim of policy incentives to reduce
costs, the Court has considered arguments by federal prisons that,
despite good faith efforts to obtain funding, fiscal constraints beyond
their control prevent the elimination of inhumane conditions. 302
Justice White worried that Wilson suggested that prison officials will
be able to defeat a Section 1983 action challenging inhumane prison
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Bowman v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 188 F. Supp. 2d 870 (M.D. Tenn. 2000); LATHAM,
supra 100, at 402 ("Payment by capitation is... an incentive for physicians to keep costs
down.").
298. Mark Hagland, How Does Your Doctor Get Paid? The Controversy Over Capitation,
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/doctor/care/capitation.html
(last
visited Mar. 28, 2005).
299. Id. "Capitated payment has become a major issue in the federal government's Medicare
managed care program as well, which has been plagued with departures by health plans and
providers who feel that payment rates are simply too low at this time to make participation
successful."
300. LATHAM, supra note 100, at 407.
301. Id.
302. Wilson v. Seiter, 510 U.S. 294, 301 (1991).
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conditions simply by showing that the conditions are caused by
insufficient funding from the legislature rather than by deliberate
indifference.3 0 3
However, policy considerations cannot dictate
30 4
punishment (in other words, cost cannot be made the issue).
D. Cruel and Unusual:A Tough, but Viable Claim for the Future
As demonstrated through this note, an inmate could potentially
raise a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment that a prison's
managed health care incentives violate the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. However, the inmate must satisfy a number of
elements before a court would recognize a violation.
These
requirements should be divided into two critical components, set out
in the existing case law.
The first prong of the prisoner's claim would establish that the
deprivation or injury as to the inmate or inmates is sufficiently
serious. 30 5
This component requires more than a scientific or
statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential harm and the
likelihood that the conditions of the health plan or managed care
system will actually cause such an injury. 30 6 The court no doubt will
review the particular managed care policy adopted by the prison. The
prisoner's claim of deliberate indifference under the second, subjective
prong would be undermined if the officials formed the policy to
demonstrate and require "adequate" health care, as the CCA policy
appeared in Bowman. Moreover, the Helling Court suggested in dicta
that the prison could adopt a new policy administered in a way that
would facially minimize risks and effectively make it impossible for an
inmate to prove that he would be exposed to "unreasonable risk" or
30 7
that he is now entitled to an injunction.
Nonetheless, courts should assess (as required by the objective
prong) whether society considers the prisoner's claimed lack of
medical attention to be so grave that it violates contemporary
standards of decency. Helling provided the example of a health risk so
severe that society would not tolerate the prison policy neglecting the
risk of exposure to cigarette smoke. 30 8 The Court's analysis, though

303. Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
304. Id. at 301-02.
305. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-49 (1981). Again, this is an objective prong
established originally in Estelle and reiterated in Farmer.
306. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993).
307. Id.
308. See id. (finding that the exposure to cigarette smoke has become objectively intolerable
and the determination was remanded to the District Court).
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not specifically related to medical treatment of prisoners, implicates
the policies of managed health care, and calls into question its various
financial incentives. Unfortunately for the prisoner, however, and
unlike the observable and grave consequences of exposure to cigarette
smoke, there is relatively little information revealing that financial
incentives in health care produce increased mortality or threat to
health. 30 9 In the future, inmates might isolate data that would
demonstrate potential negative affects of managed health care
310
incentives.
Despite the significant, yet questionable potential for a
prisoner to satisfy the first prong, the second prong imposes an even
stricter prerequisite. As previously noted, the subjective element
requires that defendants exhibit "deliberate indifference." 31' Farmer
v. Brennan appeared to employ a heightened standard from what was
arguably the lesser standard produced by Estelle. The subjective
component requires some subjectively intended act of punishment.
Again, forming the health policy in such a way as to provide at least
"adequate" medical attention significantly undermines the inmate's
claim of deliberate indifference. Thus, as the Court indicated in
Helling, a prison could adopt a policy specifically addressing any
312
future claims by its incarcerated patients.
However, the Court has suggested that if prison officials were
aware of a particular condition or cognizant of the potential dangers of
a particular condition and ignored it, their act (or failure to act) would
violate the subjective standard. The vagueness of this standard
prompts two possible situations concerning whether the prison official
knew of the potential harm to the inmate: whether 1) in spite of this
knowledge, officials acted in a way which produced the harm, or 2)
because of this knowledge they acted in a manner which resulted in
the harm. Given the analysis of the Estelle line of cases and the
nature of the government's obligations, courts are probably closer to
an "in spite of' standard.3 1 3 Even after Farmer, one can conclude that

309. LATHAM, supra note 100, at 407.
310. Arguably, Bowman v. Corrections Corporation of America, 188 F. Supp. 2d 870 (M.D.
Tenn. 2000), demonstrates such negative repercussions of financial incentives, as the District
Court determined. Clearly, Mr. Bowman's incentives were not aligned with those financial aims
of the treatment policy. Id. at 879. However, statistical data regarding the overall effects of
managed health care could satisfy this question.
311. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
312. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993).
313. See, e.g. Helling, 509 U.S. at 36 (finding that despite inmate's exposure to ETS, the
prison's failure to address its inmate's concerns raised a valid Eighth Amendment claim); Brown
v. Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450, 462 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that Sheriffs failure to train police
officer in making arrest without excessive force could constitute "deliberate indifference").

2005]

HMOs BEHIND BARS

1403

evidence of
inaction by prison officials, combined with inferential
314
actual knowledge can constitute deliberate indifference.
E. JudicialApproach to Health Policy Analysis
Although the Supreme Court has upheld financial incentives in
managed health care despite quality implications, the judiciary
withholds the authority and the obligation to clarify the Eighth
Amendment standard. 315 The Eighth Amendment restrains the
exercise of legislative power. "It seems conceded by all that the
Amendment imposes some obligations on the judiciary to judge the
that
constitutionality of punishment and that there are punishments 31
6
the Amendment would bar whether legislatively approved or not."
Despite legislative measures adopted by citizens' chosen
representatives, which provide an important means of identifying
contemporary values, "it is evident that legislative judgments alone
cannot be determinative of Eighth Amendment standards since that
Amendment was intended to safeguard individuals from the abuse of
'31 7
legislative power.
If a prisoner were to claim that managed health care violated
Constitutional rights, courts must, in order to remain consistent with
the Estelle deliberate indifference standard, focus on the incentives of
the managed health care policy. Again, if the words of the policy itself
portray its mission as striving to provide top quality medical care for
prisoners, it may be difficult to find the policy deliberately indifferent
since the documented intent is to provide adequate care. However,
despite the aim of the policy, its financial incentives could be so
perverse that they may lead to such results as in Bowman (where the
patient died of sickle cell anemia when not transferred to an expert).
Therefore, a court considering whether a policy fails the deliberate
indifference standard should look for a coverage mechanism which 1)
creates no physician disincentive, and 2) creates a physician incentive
that is at least "aligned" with the incentives of the policy's patients.
V. CONCLUSION

Courts have never concluded that managed health care, due to
its financial incentives, violates the Eighth Amendment. However, as
314. Rifkin, supra note 88, at 287.
315. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000) (holding that mixed eligibility
decisions by HMO physicians are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA).
316. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313-314 (1972).
317. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 (1976).
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contemporary standards of decency have evolved, so too has our notion
of physical harm and medical deprivations.
Given the realities of the prison system and the high costs of
health care, a complete fee for service system provided for
incarcerated citizens presents an unreasonable and impossible
solution to Mr. Bowman's problem. Accordingly, it is unlikely that
courts will ever conclude that managed health care in prisons itself
violates the Eighth Amendment, in light of our growing dependence on
the managed format. However, cases similar to Mr. Bowman's will no
doubt arise in the future, and Eighth Amendment claims could
implicate managed health care policies adopted by prisons that
employ perverse incentives schemes, such as significant capitation
arrangements. To be successful, the inmate's claim must satisfy the
two prong test showing serious injury as a result of the policy, and
deliberate indifference on behalf of the prison official.
Prisoners, like all other Americans, have no "affirmative" right
to medical treatment; rather, the nature of the government's
obligation manifests itself in a "negative" right. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court's attention to the Eighth Amendment subsequent to
Estelle v. Gamble, despite a heightened standard, suggests the
potential for a viable claim by a prisoner against a managed care
policy. If an inmate can demonstrate that the policy was harmful to
prisoners over time and, that in spite of this result officials continued
the policy, courts could find a violation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. Without a systematic study portraying harm
resulting from managed health financial incentives, such an inference
will be difficult to establish.
Courts should recognize that
contemporary standards of decency reject perverse incentive schemes
for managed care in prisons-just as courts have done for suffocating
second-hand smoke.
Richard Siever*
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